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In this paper, we will address the methodological problem of extending second-order 
models in radical constructivism. As a solution, we propose to convert second-order 
models to third-order viable first-order models. This conversion consists of 
identifying what information the students could not precisely access, in the case that 
their behaviors were the most rational in the situation. Because of this conversion, 
any converted model is expected to be viable, not only for the observer (first-order 
viable) and for the observed subject (second-order viable), but also for other persons 
(third-order viable). We will discuss the educational implications. 
INTRODUCTION 
Radical constructivism (RC) is a philosophy of knowing which assumes: 
[1-a] Knowledge is not passively received, either through the senses, or by way of 
communication; [1-b] knowledge is actively built up by the cognizing subject. [2-a] The 
function of cognition is adaptive, in the biological sense of the term, tending towards ﬁt 
or viability; [2-b] cognition serves the subject‘s organization of the experiential world, 
not the discovery of an objective ontological reality. (von Glasersfeld, 1995a, p. 51; 
Numbering added for citation) 
One of the recent contributions of RC to mathematics education is the study of how 
second-order models are developed, and what potential impact RC may have on 
practice (Ulrich, Tillema, Hackenberg, & Norton, 2014). A second-order model is a 
model of a particular student‘s thinking processes, used to explain the observer‘s 
experience (Steffe & Thompson, 2000, p. 205). The reflective use of second-order 
models can provide strong guidance for teachers and researchers (Thompson, 2000, 
pp. 303–304). However, according to Sánchez Gómez‘s (2014) comment on Ulrich et 
al. (2014), the validity of the extension of second-order models for a particular 
student to new students is not methodologically warranted. 
Although Tillema, Hackenberg, Ulrich, and Norton (2014) claimed that Sánchez 
Gómez‘s interpretation was ―different from [Tillema et al.‘s] understanding of the 
purpose of creating second-order models and the nature of these models‖ (p. 355), 
this does not seem to be a valid counterargument against Sánchez Gómez (2014) 
from the RC perspective itself. Following the RC principle [2-a] cited above, any 
interpretation should be viable for the interpreter. RC should not be able to claim that 
Sánchez Gómez misinterprets. In this paper, we will address the methodological 
problem of extending second-order models in RC (the extension problem). For this, 
we will start with a review of the nature of knowing in RC. 
NATURE OF KNOWING IN RC 
The concept of viability is the most important concept in this paper. For students, the 
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condition that pieces of knowledge reflect the absolute truth is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for their use. Rather, students seem to use them if they are viable; that is, 
―if they fit the purposive or descriptive contexts in which [the students] use them‖ 
(von Glasersfeld, 1995a, p. 14). RC is ―uninhibitedly instrumentalist‖ (p. 22). The 
term viable is not a synonym for the terms true or valid. The observation that a 
particular piece of knowledge is viable for the subject does not mean that the person 
has a particular justified belief. Rather, it means that in a particular situation, the 
subject has the disposition to make a decision to use a particular cognitive tool. 
This instrumentalist view of knowledge becomes more clear with the concept of 
knowledge-how in the sense of Ryle (1949). For example, the reason that one can 
speak logically is not that one can recall the rules of inference and apply them, it is 
because one implicitly knows how to speak in such a way. Such implicit knowledge 
is described as knowledge-how, while a propositional knowledge is described as 
knowledge-that. With this terminology, we can say that RC does not acknowledge 
any piece of knowledge-that because we cannot have access to the absolute truth. 
Rather, RC only acknowledges knowledge-how, and regards any type of knowledge 
(e.g., ideas, strategies, cognitive structures, or models) as knowledge-how. 
It is noteworthy that even cognition like ―seeing ... as ...‖ or ―recognizing ... as ...‖ is 
treated as knowledge-how. For example, suppose that a subject uses a stone to drive a 
nail into a wall because s/he cannot immediately access a hammer (cf. von 
Glasersfeld, 1995b, p. 374). Let S be the subject. Seeing a stone as a hammer is S‘s 
knowledge-how. The reason that S saw the stone as a hammer is not that S 
volitionally decided to see a stone as a hammer, and so actually saw the stone as a 
hammer. It is because S implicitly knew how to see the stone as a hammer, for 
example, how to decide which parts of the stone would correspond to the face, or the 
grip of a hammer. If S knew only how to see a small and hard substance as a stone, 
the stone would be only a stone for S. 
S cannot arbitrarily construct any knowledge-how which S wants, because the 
environment constrains the viability of S‘s knowledge-how (von Glasersfeld, 1990, p. 
24). However, note that S can arbitrarily construct any knowledge-how as long as the 
constraints are not violated. Whatever S learns from the fact, is what S selectively and 
hypothetically constructs. In the above example, the expectation that the stone can be 
used as a hammer is an ill-grounded hypothetical construct. Generally speaking, S 
actively uses, not only justified knowledge, but also hypothetical knowledge when 
trying to achieve a particular goal. In this paper, we will call this characteristic of 
knowledge use as the hypothetical nature. 
In summary, any knowledge-how construction and use are valid for S. In this sense, 
even a young, uneducated child is regarded as a mini scientist (or a mini 
mathematician). This view has shed light on the nature of children‘s construction of 
knowledge. However, it diminishes the distinction between naïve, and sophisticated, 
knowledge construction. Especially within the context of second-order models, any 
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methodological critique of the use of second-order models becomes invalid, because 
any temporal knowledge construction is scientifically valid. In the next section, we 
will address this problem. 
REAL PROBLEMS IN EXTENDING SECOND-ORDER MODELS 
The purpose of building a second-order model is ―to organize his or her experience in 
a way that helps him or her effectively interact with multiple students at different 
stages of reasoning, often at the same time‖ (Tillema et al., 2014, p. 356). That is, 
building and using second-order models is the observer‘s knowledge-how. 
Let us take an example of extending second-order models from Ulrich et al. (2014). 
They used the models of two composite units (two units of units) and only single 
composite unit (one unit of units) to explain responses from a sixth grade student 
(Charice). Two problems were given to her for promoting a meaning of powers. 
The Two-Suit Card Problem: You have the Ace through King of hearts (13 cards). Your 
friend has the ace through King of spades (13 cards). You and your friend make two-card 
hands by drawing a card from your hand, then drawing a card from your friend‘s hand, 
and putting them together. Use an array to show how many different two-card hands you 
could make. 
The Password Problem: students are creating two-character passwords for their computer 
account at school (e.g., ―FD‖ is an example password). They can choose from the 
characters A through N to create the password. How many two-character passwords are 
possible (Assume ―FD‖ and ―DF‖ count as different passwords)? (p. 333) 
The teacher/researcher expected Charice to solve each problem with two composite 
units. The two sets of 13 hearts and 13 spades are regarded as two units of units, 
because we must choose one from each of them in the Two-Suit Card Problem. The 
two sets of 14 characters are regarded as two units of units because we must choose 
one from each of them in the Password Problem. For the first problem, the teacher 
gave Charice all of the hearts in a deck of cards, and for the second problem, the 
teacher presented Charice with 14 cards on which one of the letters A through N was 
printed. Although Charice easily solved the first problem, she could not solve the 
second problem, and expressed that there is no number that is multiplied by 14. 
Because she seems to make passwords by choosing from a single set of 14 characters, 
her thinking is constrained by the model of only single composite unit (pp. 333–334). 
This extension of the second-order model is valid due to the hypothetical nature of 
knowledge use. It is, in fact, hypothetical, but reasonable and promising. Although 
Tillema et al. (2014) claimed that Sánchez Gómez‘s (2014) interpretation was 
different from theirs, we can now properly understand both Sánchez Gómez‘s and 
Tillema et al.‘s interpretations. The former viewed the hypothetical nature of the 
extension as a methodological problem, while the latter accepted the risk of the 
potentially invalid extension for possible future benefit. 
―A drowning man will clutch at a straw.‖ That is, when a person must make a 
decision without enough justified knowledge, s/he tends to use any knowledge, even 
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ill-grounded knowledge, in order to make the decision. Using ill-grounded 
knowledge and risking biased decisions is not always irrational, because making no 
decision and taking no action may make the situation worse than making the wrong 
decision. In the case of extending the second-order model, as cited above, the purpose 
is to promote effective interactions with students. No matter how likely the extension 
of a model is to be invalid, it is more rational for teachers to extend it, and to interact 
with their students, than to make no decision and take no action. 
Even if so, we cannot say that any methodological critique of extending second-order 
models is meaningless. Any extension of second-order models is idiosyncratically 
rational and valid for the extender himself or herself, while it is not always viable for 
others. Thus, as a methodological critique, we can ask the following question: How 
likely is the second-order model to be second-order viable? In RC, first-order 
viability is the viability of a piece of knowledge for the knowledge holder, while 
second-order viability is the viability of the piece of knowledge ―not only in [the 
knowledge holder‘s] own sphere of actions but also in that of the other‖ (von 
Glasersfeld, 1995a, p. 120). Simply speaking, we can say that Ulrich et al.‘s (2014) 
extension was not viable for Sánchez Gómez. This does not necessarily mean that he 
misunderstood Ulrich et al.‘s intention to promote effective interactions with 
students. Rather, it means that he did not think that he would extend and use the 
second-order model in the same way if he were the teacher of Charice. For example, 
Ulrich et al. (2014) wrote that the teacher/researcher 
… asked [Charice] to elaborate on her observation, which opened the way for her to 
continue thinking about a solution to the problem. As she moved forward in her solution, 
she determined that she could pair A with each of the 13 other letters, then concluded that 
A could also be paired with itself so that A could be paired with 14 letters, and eventually 
that each of the 14 letters could be paired with 14 other letters. (p. 335) 
The above quotation expresses only what decision the teacher actually made. It does 
not include the information on why she determined to teach in such a way. It is 
implicit from the reader‘s point of view how the extended second-order model works 
when the teacher made the decision. The proverb ―a drowning man will clutch at a 
straw‖ is second-order viable because we share the implicit assumption that there is 
nothing but the straw around the man. We naturally think that we would clutch at a 
straw if we were drowning. On the other hand, the second-order model of only one 
composite unit does not necessarily have high second-order viability because we 
cannot assume that there are no different second-order models. Thus, in the next 
section, we will discuss how we can make the model to be second-order viable. 
FROM SECOND-ORDER VIABILITY TO THIRD-ORDER VIABILITY 
A possible reason that the second-order model of only one composite unit does not 
have high second-order viability is that it does not explain why some students think 
in such a way. Any second-order model is problematic for the same reason. 
This problem is similar to Confrey‘s (1991) critique of using the label misconception: 
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Labeling a student‘s model as a misconception fails to take in consideration the 
perspective of the student, for whom the belief may explain all instances under 
consideration, and fail only in cases to which s/he is not privy. [...] Finally, others have 
chosen more simply conception, which omits any indication that the perspective may 
deviate considerably from the expert‘s position. (p. 121) 
Although the term second-order model does not have a modifier like mis, labeling a 
student‘s thinking as a second-order model is often equal to misconception. The 
second-order model has provided the distinction between correct and incorrect 
thinking. It has not provided the explanation of idiosyncratic rationality for students. 
Unless we identify the students‘ idiosyncratic reason that they think with only single 
composite unit, we still implicitly keep the label mis. 
For RC, it is important to explain idiosyncratic rationality. Based on the RC principle 
[2-b], all decisions are idiosyncratically rational. The fact that a person made a 
particular decision means that there was at least a moment when s/he thought that it 
was the most rational decision, even if it is later understood to be irrational, based on 
new information. Since human beings have only a limited capacity to deal with 
incoming information, we cannot deal with too much information at one time. We 
become, however, able to deal with a great deal of data at once if we acquire the 
ability to abstract and mathematise information. Thus, in mathematics education, we 
should assume that novices might not know what information is important to them, 
while focusing on that which is trivial; but the novices will always behave in the most 
rational way from their own point of view. Lacking the knowledge of what 
information is important is not necessarily careless; it is a result of overconcentration 
on other pieces of information. This characteristic of novices is referred to as local 
rationality. In contrast, experts‘ rationality, developed by dealing regularly with 
relatively large amounts of information, is referred to as global rationality. 
Although the use of second-order models fails to explain the local rationality of 
students, there is one possible solution to this problem. It is to convert the already 
existing second-order models to the observer‘s first-order models. This would be 
achieved by identifying the information the students were not able to access, 
provided their behavior was otherwise rational, given the information they did have. 
For example, in case of Charice, the teacher (i) presented the Password Problem to 
Charice, (ii) demonstrated a way of creating two-letter passwords with a set of 14 
cards, and (iii) asked Charice if she could make a chart to solve for the total number 
of passwords. Then, (iv) Charice wrote down the list of 14 characters, and stopped 
solving (p. 333). In this case, Charice‘s response would be considered rational, even 
from our perspective, if step (i) did not exist. The teacher‘s question at step (iii) 
seems to shift Charice‘s interest from the Password Problem to the question itself. At 
this moment, she lost the need to solve the Password Problem, and suddenly needed 
to make a chart. According to the assumption of local rationality, Charice probably 
over concentrated on creating a chart. This situation is one in which the information 
presented at steps (i) and (ii) became inaccessible. 
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Suppose that we were she, and that we could not access the precise information 
presented at steps (i) and (ii). Then, for making a chart, we would have to recall how 
we had made similar charts. Although we had made them by choosing two units (e.g., 
hearts and spades in the Two-Suit Card Problem) until now, we could find only one 
unit (a set of 14 cards). We would not notice that we used only one set twice 
previously, because the information that we used a set twice was inaccessible because 
of our current assumption. As a result, we would be confused, because we could not 
make a chart in the same way as before. In this way, we find that we ourselves would 
also use only one composite unit, if important information suddenly became 
inaccessible. 
There are two advantages to the above conversion. First, the converted model enables 
the teacher to empathise with the students. The model of only one composite unit is 
converted from a second-order model for explaining the students‘ behavior, to a first-
order model for explaining the observer‘s virtual experience. While second-order 
models are only first-order viable, the converted models are not only first-order 
viable, but also second-order viable for the observer, because it is viable not only for 
the observer, but also for the students. Because of this second-order viability, it is 
easier for the observer to understand the students‘ thinking with the converted models, 
than with the corresponding second-order models. 
If we understand the local rationality of the students, the question of why there are 
such students is easily answered. The reason that there are students modeled by the 
model, is that some teachers‘ behavior unintentionally causes them to lose focus on 
the important information. For example, in case of Charice, the reason that she used 
only one composite unit is that the teacher‘s question at the step (iii) unintentionally 
caused her to lose the focus on the information in steps (i) and (ii). Although, of 
course, there is the possibility that the student is careless, attributing the cause of the 
student‘s behavior to the teacher‘s behavior makes it easy for the teacher to 
empathise with the student, and to consider what to do next. 
The second advantage is that the converted model is expected to be not only second-
order viable for the observer, but also second-order viable for the third person, like 
the readers of research papers. For example, although the second-order model of only 
one composite model does not seem to be viable for Sánchez Gómez, the converted 
model is viable, even for him, because it provides him with a method to empathise 
with the student. If it is still not viable for him, the reason is not that the converted 
model itself lacks viability, but that he cannot accept the assumption of local 
rationality. The conversion includes the process of explaining novices‘ local 
rationality so that even experts can understand it. Thus, as long as the nature of local 
rationality is assumed, any converted model is expected to be viable not only for the 
observer (i. e., the first person ―I‖) and for the observed subject (i. e., the second 
person ―you‖), but also for other persons (i.e., the third persons ―they‖; e.g., the 
readers of the research papers). Second-order viability is stronger than first-order, and 
this new viability is stronger than second-order. Therefore, we will call it third-order 
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viability. 
Third-order viability is the key concept for solving the extension problem. The first-
order viable second-order models are retrospectively built after some observation. 
Since it strictly depends upon observation, the models are fragile. Since they are not 
related to any other information, we are constrained to use them without any 
supplemental information. On the other hand, the third-order viable first-order 
models are assimilated into the observer‘s existing knowledge when they are 
converted from the corresponding second-order models. That is, much of the 
observer‘s past experience will support using the third-order viable first-order models. 
Although it is never safe, in the sense that they are only approximate models of 
absolute reality, it is useful in that the observer can use them in accordance with his 
or her own empirically, well-tested, viable, existing knowledge. In the next section, 
we will discuss how to use third-order viable first-order models as educational tools. 
EDUCATIONAL IMPLICATIONS AND CONCLUSION 
Before discussing the implications of using third-order viable first-order models for 
education, note that we do not intend to criticise Charice‘s teacher in the discussion 
below. According to the assumption of local rationality, we believe that the teacher‘s 
real-time practice was done to the best of her ability and understanding, based on her 
experience. We do not believe that the teacher should have done anything differently. 
Here, we will discuss what we could do in similar circumstances as Charice‘s teacher. 
Even if we discover the cause of the students‘ behavior, we must keep in mind that 
eliminating that cause is not always the best way to improve the lesson. For example, 
the cause of Charice‘s behavior seemed to be the teacher‘s question as to whether 
Charice could make a chart. However, if the teacher presented only the Password 
Problem itself, and provided no support to solve it, then Charice could not know what 
to do. Since ancient times, it has been well known that introducing sub-questions in 
assignments is one of the most effective ways of supporting students. To cease 
introducing sub-questions would be ineffective. 
Let us elucidate the model of Charice‘s thinking: From the hypothesis that she lost 
the need to solve the Password Problem because of the requirement to make a chart, 
it is deduced that she was not ready to make a chart. In fact, no one can a priori 
determine what a given problem will require one to do. It is determined after solving 
the problem. Thus, generally speaking, a student needs to notice, by himself or 
herself, that making a chart is a useful solution for this problem. 
Keeping in mind the above, we can provide a useful approach to teaching the 
Password Problem in the future. A possible situation in which a student notices the 
usefulness of creating a chart is one in which s/he must make new passwords one 
after another. For example, suppose that (i) students engage in a game; (ii) it requires 
them to make new passwords by turns; and (iii) one wins the game by making more 
passwords than the other students make. In the game, the students may randomly 
create passwords, but gradually they will realise that it becomes more difficult to 
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create new passwords according to the rules the longer the game lasts. Then, they will 
realise that a system for generating these passwords is required. The need to make a 
chart will arise. If they make many passwords by themselves, we can also expect 
them to notice on their own that the pile should be used twice. In this case, the role of 
the teacher will not include prompting them to make a chart. Rather, the teacher 
would (i) find the first student who makes a chart, (ii) share the information that that 
particular student is creating and using a chart, and (iii) encourage the students to 
consider what kind of chart would be the best for winning the game. This approach 
would be expected to help the students to understand the usefulness of tables as a 
preliminary step towards understanding powers. 
In this paper, as a solution of the methodological problem of extending second-order 
models, we proposed to convert second-order models to third-order viable first-order 
models. However, the paper does not provide a general strategy for converting 
second-order models. The method of conversion still depends on each second-order 
model. Developing a practical strategy is an issue to be addressed in the future. 
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